Healthy Skepticism Library item: 5753

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Publication type: chapter

Miller D .
Commentary: Psychologically Naive Assumptions about the Perils of Conflicts of Interest
Moore , D A, Cain , Dm , Loewenstein G. Conflicts of interest: Challenges and solutions in business, law, medicine, and public policy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press 2005

Abstract:

Comments that Cain et al. (see record 2005-08061-007) make
an excellent case that one should not be optimistic that forcing an
agent to disclose a conflict of interest will eliminate or even reduce the
degree
of bias in the advice given by that agent. I submit, however, that there
is
at least one other reason for expecting that the advice given by an
adviser following disclosure might be more rather than less biased. The act
of disclosure may liberate advisers from concerns about ethicality not
only because it establishes in their mind, and perhaps in the mind of
their
client, their credentials as an ethical person but also because it leaves
them
feeling unfairly penalized. Much unethical behavior is justified by the sense
of fairness or entitlement. Cain and his collaborators make a strong
case
that it is psychologically naive to assume that disclosing conflicts of
interest
will undermine their pernicious effects. One implication of this argument
is
that the remedy of divestiture is preferable to disclosure. Possibly, but
I
would end by pointing out that divestiture might not be the panacea it is
assumed to be either. The rationale for divestiture is that once an adviser no
longer
has an incentive for promoting a particular concern, any advice he or she
gives pertaining to that concern will no longer be biased. This is a
reassuring assumption, but unfortunately it too is a psychologically naive one.
(PsycINFO Database Record © 2005 APA, all rights reserved)